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not hold himself out as ready to carry all who requested transportation he was
not operating a common carrier. Brown v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. of
Calif., 8 F. (2d) 996 (C.C.A. 5th, 1925). And since the contributions were volun-
tary he was not under a contractual duty to the passengers and therefore was
not a private carrier. Marks et al. v. Home Fire and Marine Insurance Co. of
Calif., 285 Fed. 959 (App. D.C. 1923).
The question whether he was carrying for hire or compensation offers more
difficulty. In deciding whether the Board of Railroad Commissioners had juris-
diction over a motor vehicle as being operated for hire, the words "for hire"
were held to mean "for remuneration of any kind, paid or promised, either
directly or indirectly." Murphy et al v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 49 S.D.
197, 207 N.W. 92 (1926). When the owner of the car himself contributed his
proportionate share of the gas, oil, and garage expenses for a trip, it has been
held that there was not a carrying for hire or compensation so as to make the
driver exercise a higher degree of care. Askowith v. Massel, 250 Mass. 202, 156
N.E. 875 (1927). Requiring the passenger to pay the cost of the gas and oil
used on a trip has been held not a carrying for hire. Armistead v. Lenkeit, 230
Ala. 155, 160 So. 257 (1935). But where students agreed to pay the amount of
gas and oil used on a trip plus a small sum to the driver for the use of the
car, it was held a carrying for hire within the provisions of defendant's insur-
ance policy because of the slight sum given in addition to the cost of the gas and
oil. Gross et al. v. Kubel, 315 Pa. 396, 172 Atl. 649 (1934).
Where plaintiff's car was used for hire on two or three occasions to carry
passengers to fair grounds during a county fair, it was not such a carrying for
hire as would enable an insurance company to avoid liability on its policy, the
court holding that in order to make a carrying for hire or compensation result
in a foreiture of the policy it must be shown that the automobile was used con-
tinuously for that purpose, or that the owner made a business of it. Comner-
cial Union Assurance Co. of London v. Hill, 167 S.W. 1095 (Texas, 1914). If
there is a carrying for hire it makes no difference that the compensation was
never in fact paid. Thus, where the plaintiff made an agreement to carry for a
certain sum and the passenger stole the car, recovery for the value of the car
was refused by the court since the car was being used in violation of the pro-
visions of the policy. Mittet et al. v. Home Insurance Co., 49 S.D. 319, 207 N.W.
49 (1926).
ROBERT P. HAMM.
Workmen's Compensation-Accident Distinguished from Occupational Dis-
ease.-The plaintiff operated for one day a motor truck which emitted exces-
sive quantities of fumes. These were inhaled by the plaintiff, who contracted
pneumonia as a result. Held, that pneumonia thus acquired was not an injury
by "accident" within the New Mexico Workmen's Compensation Act, since the
victim was "conscious of no mishap, hazard, or-misadventure." Stevenson v.
Lee Moor Contracting Co., 9 U.S.L. WEEK 2242 (N.Mex. Sup. Ct., Sept. 21,
1940).
The subjection of an employee to extraordinary strain, or unusual conditions
and definite as to time and place, causing injury, is an "accidental" injury,
under the compensation acts. Esmonde v. Lima Locomotive Works, 51 Ohio App.
454, 1 N.E. (2d) 633 (1937). Where the disability results from continual breath-
ing of iron dust, and the employee can point to no particular occurrence or time
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as the beginning of such disability, it is not an accidental injury, but is an occu-
pational disease and not compensable. Peru Plow and Wheel Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 311 Ill. 216, 142 N.E. 546 (1924). Where the plaintiff contracted
tuberculosis from inhaling hydrogen sulphide gas discharged from an oil well
in an unusually heavy volume, while performing a certain job, it was held an
"accident" within the Workmen's Compensation Law, since it was an injury
coming "unexpectedly," resulting at a definite time and place, and from a defi-
nite cause, as distinguished from an occupational disease. Barron v. Texas Em-
ployers' Ins. Assn., 36 S.W. (2d) 464 (Tex. Com. App., 1931). An unusual
and excessive exposure inducing a certain physical condition was held to be
unexpected and occasioned by "accident" within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. Hallenbeck v. Butler, 101 Colo. 486, 74 P. (2d) 708 (1937).
But where a plasterer worked for two days in a place where it was necessary
to get his feet and legs wet, and as a result contracted lobar pneumonia from
which he died ten days later, the pneumonia was not an "accident" within the
Workmen's Compensation Act, because the disease resulted from exposure in the
ordinary course of the employee's work. Joyce v. Luse-Stevenson Co., 139 S.W.
(2d) 918, (Mo. 1940). An employee engaged in cleaning machines while
the floors of the plant were still damp and muddy after a flood, contracted
pneumonia as a result of the conditions under which he had been working.
This was not an "accident" within the compensation laws, for there was no sud-
den, intense exposure; and this protracted labor was engaged in voluntarily.
Parks v. Miller Printing Mach. Co., 336 Pa. 455, 9 At. (2d) 742 (1939). An
employee of a packing house, in the performance of his employment, had to go
back and forth from a high temperature in the smoke house to a near freezing
temperature in the cooling room, and got wet through a defective apron, catching
a cold which resulted in fatal pneumonia. This was held not to be an "injury"
compensable under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Law. Lux v. Western
Casualty Co., 107 F. (2d) 1002 (C.C.A. 5th, 1939). It was held not to be a com-
pensable "injury" where the plaintiff, doing heavy and fast work in a very hot
room, became nauseated and developed a fever, followed by pneumonia. Proof
of these conditions merely conducive to developing a disease causing disability
is not sufficient proof of a compensable injury. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Clark,
140 S.W. (2d) 890 (Tex. Civ. App., 1940).
However, even where an employee engaged for a long period of time in work
during which he was exposed to coal dust and gas fumes, became suddenly and
violently ill, the injury was held compensable because the employee had reached
the limit of his endurance at a specific time. "An 'accident' as contemplated
by the Workmen's Compensation Law," said the court, "is distinguished from
an occupational disease, in that it arises by some definite event the date of
which can be fixed with certainty, but which cannot be so fixed in the case of
occupational diseases." Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Guthrie, 167 Okla. 83, 27
Pac. (2d) 814 (1933).
And similarly where an employee, in the course of his employment, was
subjected to great changes of temperature, and began feeling pain and constric-
tion in his chest, resulting in his death eight days later from pneumonia, the
injury was held to be compensable for it was an "unusual, sudden" and "un-
expected" happening, at a "particular" time, resulting in physical injuries acci-
dental in origin and cause. Johnson v. Industrial Comission, 63 Ohio App. 544,
27 N.E. (2d) 418 (1939). Likewise, where there was expert testimony that the
trauma caused by a fall was likely to result in pneumonia, pneumonia so con-
tracted is compensable as following a definite injury. A. Breslauer Co. v. Indus-
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trial Commission, 167 Wis. 202, 167 N.W. 256 (1918). Decedent, on an emergency
call, got his feet wet when his car stalled, and immediately operated on his
patient, because of necessity, in the basement dispensary, which was extremely
cold. This was an unusual procedure, but necessary. Following a chill he got
pneumonia and died. This was an "accident" within the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, as establishing a "mishap or untoward occurrence." Roth v. Locust
Mountain State Hospital, 130 Pa. Sup. 1, 196 Atl. 924 (1938). Where pneumonia
was caused by the inhaling of chlorine gas released by a sudden explosion, the
illness and death were held a "personal injury" within the meaning of the Texas
Workmen's Compensation Act. Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Smith, 266 S.W. 574 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1924). Where decedent contracted miliary tuberculosis as a result of
a gas explosion, the disease, as proximately caused by the explosion, was an
accident within the Workmen's Compensation Act of Wisconsin. Heileman
Brewing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 161 Wis. 46, 152 N.W. 446 (1915).
Where the plaintiff suddenly and unexpectedly inhaled a quantity of carbon
monoxide gas while under a car to repair it when the engine was running suffer-
ing serious injury to his heart and permanent disability, it was stated that
though inhalation of the gas lasted for more than an hour it was a com-
pensable "accident." Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Noack, 45 S.W. (2d)
798 (Tex. Civ. App., 1931). Death of double lobar pneumonia caused by the
forced inhalation of large quantities of sulphur dioxide gas, due to defects of a
pipe on which deceased was working for two days, was a compensable injury,
for here there was inhalation of an unusual amount of gas, assignable to a
time, place and cause. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Broadway, 110 F. (2d) 357
(C.C.A. 5th, 1940). Where an automobile mechanic inhaled an extra large
amount of exhaust fumes while repairing an automobile when the garage doors
were closed, the inhalation continuing for one-half day, pneumonia which re-
suited was an accident within the Workmen's Compensation Act of Colorado
as being traceable to a definite time, place and cause, and was an unexpected
occurrence. Columbine Laundry Co. v. Industrial Commission of Colorado, 73
Colo. 397, 215 Pac. 870 (1923).
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